Th ere are more than enough (syntactic, semantic, pragmatic) diffi culties in constructing deontic logic. We suppose that at least some of them can be overcome by means of temporal qualifi cation of the relation of deontic alternativeness and by modifi cation of the so-called "standard" models. We use a temporal structure that is discrete, branching "to the left" and infinite in both directions. Th e system of tense-logic based on this structure has been developed thanks to works by J. P. Burgess. Th e essence of our development consists in providing the system with facilities for comparison of times of events being found on diff erent "branches" of a set of possible courses of events.
I
Th ere are more than enough diffi culties in constructing deontic logic. Th e characters and the types of these diffi culties -syntactic, semantic, pragmatic -are various ones. From them many relevant questions arise. For example, how we ought to qualify the status of variables? Th at is, whether they are thought to represent categories of human actions or to express sentences that represent states of aff airs? If the latter is the case, what is it to be such a state of aff airs?
We suppose that all obligations are conditional ones, though the conditions are expressed in various linguistic forms and often some obligations appear to be unconditional ones. Let us consider an example:
"Do not p forget to switch off your mobile telephones during the presentation ; however if p you did and q during the presentation a bell rang r you ought to apologize ". In symbolic form we have got:
At fi rst sight it might seem that only the second obligation Or is conditional and the fi rst one is unconditional. But rather soon 1 we fi nd that the fi rst obligation is supplied with a condition -"during the presentation".
However, it seems that the technical means for the expression of conditional obligations are rather more complicated than the ones for unconditional obligations. So, instead of a formula O (B/A) where A is a condition for B to be obligatory we may write: (A → OB) & (¬A → ¬OB). Th e second member of the conjunction allows us to account for the relevancy A with respect to B. Otherwise we could fall into a fallacy and would formalize O (B/A) as (A → OB). Th en O (B/A) would be true whenever A is false and/or OB is true.
When constructing systems of deontic logic we use some principles which appear to be quite plausible we often encounter various paradoxical conclusions. So, for example, if we combine a collection principle, CP:
with the Kantian principle ("ought" implies "can"), KP: OA → ◊B we may obtain 2 :
-4, 5, modus ponens So, the lines 2 and 6 yield a contradiction. Or let us combine two other principles that also appear to be quite plausible ones. According to the fi rst of them, if we are obligated to provide a state of aff airs A and it is the case that some other state of aff airs B would be incompatible with A then we are obligated to act in such a way that there would no be B: OA & (B → ¬A) → O ¬B. According to the second principle: O ¬ B ¬OB. Th en the following formula is proved: 
II
It seems quite natural, after G. H. von Wright (1996) , to accept the following defi nitions.
Defi nition 1:
A state of aff airs that can be produced or destroyed, prevented from coming about or from vanishing (if it is just there) is called a doable state. Defi nition 2: A state of aff airs is called doable in pragmatical sense if its obtaining or not-obtaining in given conditions can be a result of human action.
Defi nition 3:
(1) By a genuine norm is called such an obliging norm, O-norm or a permitting norm, P-norm the content of which is a doable state in the pragmatical sense. (2) A norm the content of which is a necessary or impossible state of affairs is called non-genuine, or spurious.
Defi nition 4:
(1) A set of O-norms is deontically consistent if the conjunction of their contents expressed a doable state of aff airs is an obtainable formula. (2) Every set of P-norms is deontically consistent.
As it is known, in semantical investigations of deontic logic a so-called "standard model" appears as the following:
in which W is a (non-empty) set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation of deontic alternativeness, and V is a mapping from the set of propositional letters Var = ⎨p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , …⎬ to subsets of the set W. So a proposition p i is true in a possible world α if and only if α is included into a subset w i of W where w i is a product of the mapping. Commonly the evaluation is extended to the use of deontic operators. For example:
Let us note, in standard models there is no expression of dependence of norms on time.
III
We suppose that at least some of the diffi culties in constructing deontic logic can be overcome by means of temporal qualifi cation of the relation of deontic alternativeness and by modifi cation of the so-called "standard" models. We use a temporal structure that is discrete, branching "to the right" and infi nite in both directions. Th e system of tense-logic based on this structure has been developed thanks to works by J. P. Burgess (1979; 1980) . Th e essence of our development consists in providing the system with means for the comparison of times of events being found on diff erent "branches" of a set of possible courses of events.
Th e basic relation of precedence is defi ned as a degree of an elementary relation <′ which is characterized by the following features:
Th e defi nition of the degree of the relation <′ is the following:
Also, let us introduce two conditions:
Th ere exists a relation only with a fi nite (though not limited by any concrete number) degree between the elements of the basic set (n ++ ):
Th ere are no "loops": ∀n(x < n y → x ≠ y)
Now we introduce the defi nition of a complete relation on the basic set:
Th is relation is characterized by the following features:
IV
Th us, we will use the above-described model of time ℑ b = 〈T, <〉 in which T = ⎨x, y, z, …⎬ is a basic (non-empty) set of "moments" and < is a binary relation "earlier-later than". Supposing that none of the "possible futures" could be qualifi ed as a real one and since we do not want to make concessions to fatalism, we use the following temporal operators: F'A for "It is necessary that it will be the case that A"; F''A for "It is necessary that at the appointed time it will be the case that A "; G'A for "It is necessary that it will always be that A"; PA for "It has been the case that A".
We defi ne the common abbreviations: gA = ¬F'¬ A, i.e. "it is possible that it will always be that A"; g'A = ¬F''¬ A, i.e. "it is possible that it will always, with exception of some time, be the case that A"; fA = ¬G¬ A, i.e. "it is possible that it will be the case that A"; HA = ¬P ¬ A, i.e. "it has always been the case that A".
Our supplement to Burgess' system consists in the axioms of discreteness and also in axioms which circumscribe characteristics of the operator F''A. For the constructed system K b proofs of its soundness, adequacy, and thus, completeness have been provided. Th ere is also the proof of its decidability (Karavaev 1992 ).
V
Now for the possible worlds a relation of "historical identity" is introduced: α ≅ t β if and only if α(t' ) = β(t' ) for every t' < t, and the relation of deontic alternativeness is relativized with respect to times:
Now a valuation is the following:
if and only if β∈ w i (t).
Th us revised by means of the temporal qualifi cation model μ t = 〈W t , R t , V t 〉 where W t is a Cartesian product of the set W and the set T, the propositions are evaluated with respect to a pair 〈α, t〉 and the expression μ t A(α, t) designates "A is true in the world α at time t ".
All the conditions of truth are also relativized:
(1) μ t p i (α, t) if and only if (iff ) α ∈ w i (t), for i = 0, 1, 2, … (2) μ t A(α, t) iff 〈α,t〉 ∈ V t (A) (3) μ t ¬ A(α, t) iff not μ t A(α, t) (or μ t A(α, t)) (4) μ t (A → B) (α, t) iff not μ t A(α, t) or μ t B(α, t) (5) μ t OA(α, t) iff ∀β ∈ W t (α R t β ⇒ μ t A(β, t)) (6) μ t HA(α, t) iff ∀t' ∈ T(t' < t ⇒ μ t A(α, t' )) (7) μ t PA (α, t) iff ∃t' ∈ T(t' < t & μ t A(α, t' ))
Let us introduce into the language two modal-temporal operators:
"historical necessity" t :
and "historical possibility" ◊ t :
Further, defi ne a special deontic-temporal operator O t :
Th is is an expression of some kind of historical predetermination. It tells that independently of human actions and eff orts the state of aff airs described by means of the proposition A either obtains or does not obtain in every world from some set of worlds which share one and the same history. Further, note that if condition (10) fails to obtain this means that we are dealing with the formulation of genuine norms. Evidently, there are 27 conjunctions of the forms G'A, F'A, and ¬F'A. Only seven of from them are essentially diff erent: G'A which allows us to defi ne a deontic modality "it is obligatory"; (G'A ∨ F'A) which expresses "it is favourable"; (G'A ∨ ¬F'A) which expresses "it is either obligatory or forbidden"; F'A which expresses "it is permissible"; (F'A ∨ ¬F'A) which expresses "it is either permissible or forbidden"; F'A which expresses "it is forbidden (not-permissible)"; (G'A ∨ F'A ∨ ¬F'A) which expresses "it is indiff erent in normative sense".
And there is also a form F''A, i.e. "it is permissible at the appointed time".
Evidently, completeness and decidability of the tensed logical system K b apply to a system of deontic logic with the above-mentioned modalities.
Th e part of the system which meets the requirement for the operators t and ◊ t is at least the system S5. Its "mixed" schemes of provable formulae are in particular:
DT.1 t A → OA; this scheme corresponds to the condition R t ; DT.2 OA → ◊ t A; this scheme also corresponds to the condition R t and represents a stronger version of the Kantian principle: "ought" implies "can". DT.3 t A ↔ O t A and DT.4 ◊ t A ↔ O ◊ t A; according to them statements about obligations, if they concern "historically necessary" or "historically possible" states of aff airs, turn out to be empty statements.
Th e operator defi ned by the condition (1) allows us to affi rm that propositions about historically predetermined states of aff airs are, in normative sense, empty ones.
DT.5 O t A → (A ↔ OA)
Statement: Let Ω is any (sensible) temporal modality of past time, i.e. something expressed in our formalized language by means of any fi nite and nonempty sequence of operators H and P. Th en if a formula A does not contain entries of operators t , ◊ t and O then the proposition O t ΩA is true. On the grounds of the above-mentioned statement and the thesis DT.5 it is possible to conclude that judgements expressed by means of propositions of past time always will be, in normative sense, empty ones. When a formula A does not contain entries of operators t , ◊ t and O the proposition (ΩA ↔ O t ΩA) is true. It is quite clear: obligations imposed and accepted at present and pertinent to past events do not have any normative meaning. Indeed, "You ought (today) to present at yesterday's meeting" does not mean much more than "May be, you presented at yesterday's meeting".
